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1 Introduction
During 1999–2000, Ethiopia suffered its worst
food security crisis in a decade and a half. High
levels of acute malnutrition prevailed throughout
many areas of the country, and high levels of excess
mortality were observed in areas of the Somali
Region in early to mid-2000. Overall, 10 million
people were estimated to be in need of assistance at
the peak of the crisis. Over the course of the two
years, nearly 1.5 million metric tons of food aid,
and a smaller amount of complementary non-food
assistance was made available by the Government
of Ethiopia and the international community,
before the crisis was brought under control.
Famines or major food security crises are not new to
Ethiopia, and the 1999–2000 situation was a classic
slow-onset crisis, triggered by drought, which began
in some areas of the country as early as 1997–8 and
worsened steadily during 1999. Since the
catastrophic famines of the mid-1980s, the
humanitarian community (including the
Government of Ethiopia as well as donors, the UN
and NGOs) has invested heavily in institutional
improvements for famine prevention in Ethiopia.
These have included improved capacity in early
warning and assessment by the Disaster Prevention
and Preparedness Commission (DPPC); a major
expansion in the strategic food grains reserve held
by the Ethiopian Emergency Food Security Reserve
(EFSR); a DPPC-led system of using food aid to
promote public works-based safety nets; and a
variety of improvements in the administration of
famine assistance. Thus the risk was well known; the
institutions needed to prevent famine were in place;
and this particular crisis was reasonably well
predicted. In brief, Ethiopia 1999–2000 should have
been a relatively straightforward case study of the
way in which famine prevention mechanisms work,
and there need not have been a humanitarian crisis. 
Yet this was one of the worst food security crises in
the Greater Horn of Africa since 1985. It was not
until extraordinary responses were invoked –
personal visits by a number of senior aid officials
and the appointment of a United Nations Special
Envoy to oversee the response – that the response
became substantial enough to bring the crisis under
control. And by that time, the evidence suggests
that the humanitarian crisis had already peaked.
The obvious question is: why did all this happen?IDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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This article is a brief review of some of the major
factors that contributed to the extent of the crisis in
Ethiopia in 1999–2000. It is based on a longer
article that presents a more detailed analysis
(Hammond and Maxwell 2002). Both articles are
intended to suggest lessons for the humanitarian
and development communities in Ethiopia and
elsewhere; neither is an attempt to apportion blame
or point fingers. Analytically, the ‘why did this
happen?’ question is important to address;
practically, the ‘what should be done differently?’
question is equally important. This article focuses
on the first question, and makes some suggestions
towards the second.
2 A brief overview of the crisis
Other articles have reviewed the crisis thoroughly
(Hammond and Maxwell 2002; Hammond 2001;
Salama et al. 2001; Sandford and Habtu 2000) and
this article is not another attempt to do so.
However, a few key points are necessary to briefly
review for the analysis. First, the ‘crisis’ was actually
several events that joined together. These were
triggered by a series of relatively moderate shocks.
Despite the number of people affected, this crisis
was not ‘the big one,’ in terms of causal factors –
which, in terms of drought, for Ethiopia would be a
failure of the main meher rains, or back-to-back
failures (Hammond 2001). Second, while the early
warning system functioned reasonably well in the
densely populated agricultural highlands, it did not
do so well in pastoral areas, where in many cases
early warning hardly existed, and where it did exist,
it was poorly adapted to the local conditions
(Hammond 2001; Sandford and Habtu 2000).
Third, human malnutrition was widespread – not
only in the agricultural highlands where the crisis
struck first in 1999, but particularly in the pastoral
areas throughout 1999 and 2000. These areas also
suffered a major loss of livestock assets, and the
long-term effects of the crisis are still being felt.
Though surveys of mortality were few, where they
were carried out, loss of human life was substantial
(Salama et al. 2001).
Fourth, there was a substantial gap in the
availability of food assistance. The Emergency Food
Security Reserve was at a relatively low level of
stock in 1999 at the outset of the crisis, and for the
most part was not significantly replenished during
the entirety of the crisis. The rate of repayment of
old debts to the EFSR by donors was slow, and as a
result, the Reserve was not able to play the crucial
role for which it had been designed – that of filling
a gap between requirements for food and the arrival
of food aid from international sources (Hammond
and Maxwell 2002; CARE and FEWSNET 2000).
The level of food aid available for distribution was
substantially below assessed requirements for eight
out of nine months in late 1999 and early 2000, as
the crisis grew to its peak. The shortfall between
assessed requirements and food available for
distribution over the course of these months was
close to half a million tons (Hammond and Maxwell
2002, citing WFP and DPPC data). This situation
began to change in the wake of high profile visits to
Ethiopia by aid agency officials in early 2000, which
finally triggered a substantial response. No one
knows for sure what effect the gap in food
assistance had on the course of the crisis in any
given location, but it can only be presumed to have
had an adverse effect. Molla (2001) notes in
particular the shortfall of food assistance compared
with assessed needs in the Somali Region in the
run-up to the peak of the crisis, but in general,
specific information on the localised impact of
shortfalls in food distributions is not available.
Fifth, of course, was that the entire period of the
crisis was framed by the Ethiopian/Eritrean war,
which began in 1998, and broke out into major
fighting in early 1999. The fighting effectively
ended in May 2000 in the wake of an Ethiopian
offensive. While the war displaced civilian
populations on both sides of the border, it was not
a major cause of the humanitarian crisis (at least
not until the offensive that ended the war, and the
humanitarian crisis caused by the offensive was on
the Eritrean side of the border).
3 Stakeholder views of
explanatory factors
The historical context of this case, and extensive
interviews with a variety of actors within the
humanitarian community, suggest at least five
major categories of explanation for the crisis of
1999–2000. None of them fully explains what
happened, but all contribute to an understanding,
and each has implications for future humanitarian
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practice. Most of these perspectives revolve around
the gap in the response, and the effect that this had
on exacerbating the crisis:
l logistical and bureaucratic problems caused the
gap
l information problems and poor informational
linkages caused the gap
l informational problems aside, institutional
mistrust delayed the response
l the war with Eritrea led to a major rift with
donors
l famine prevention institutions focused on the
‘event’ rather than the ‘process’ of famine –
underlying causes were not adequately
addressed.
Each of these is explored below.
3.1 Logistical and bureaucratic problems
The first explanation that hinges primarily on the
gap in the food aid pipeline, notes that a
combination of unrelated, one-off coincidences
happened in the same period of time, and
unfortunately they all happened at the worst
possible time. While not all were due purely to
logistical bottlenecks, neither were they the result
of negligence or malfeasance. There was indeed
one large shipment of food that was significantly
delayed because of a variety of problems related to
administrative oversight of donor budgets. There is
no doubt also, that logistical and security
problems, as well as limited operational capacity,
hampered emergency operations in the Somali
Region, where roads are poor and populations are
typically dispersed over vast and remote areas
(Salama et al. 2001). Similarly, the vast majority of
food assistance – in addition to all of Ethiopia’s
other imports – had to pass through the port of
Djibouti. But in fact, there were surprisingly few
logistical bottlenecks in the port, due to good
logistical coordination.
However, it was these kinds of delays and logistical
problems that the EFSR was set up in order to
circumvent. In addition, the amount of the
shortfall was substantially greater than the amount
of the delayed shipment. Thus, while contributing
to the magnitude of the shortfall in food assistance,
such problems can hardly be said to be the cause of
the shortfall in food assistance. For several years,
analysts have been aware of the problem that the
rate of replenishment of the EFSR was significantly
slower than it was designed to be. The estimated
stock requirements were calculated in relation to
the extent of vulnerability, but in fact over time, it
has become clear that stock levels also need to be
set according to ‘lead time’ – or the amount of time
it takes to repay after grain has been loaned out
against a pledge. Proposals to change the levels of
grain in the reserve were on the table at the time
the crisis began (NRI 1999).
3.2 Information problems and links
between information and response
A second explanation for how the situation got out
of hand is that the information forecasting the extent
of the problem was too slow in coming to the
attention of the international community. There is
some validity to this point of view, but again it is only
a very partial explanation. There was admittedly a
problem with the initial 1998 pre-harvest
assessment, which overestimated the projected grain
availability for 1999. This estimate was revised
downward in early 1999 (and emergency assistance
requirements revised upwards), but by that point,
donors had focused their attention elsewhere. The
extent to which the failure of the 1999 belg rains
pushed people to the brink of disaster also took the
humanitarian community by surprise, because it set
off much wider than expected effects. Lastly, there is
little doubt that the early warning in the pastoral
areas failed to give adequate forewarning of the
problems there. Several initiatives are urgently
addressing this issue at present.
Nevertheless, it cannot be logically argued that an
information problem was responsible for the delay
in response. First, the extent to which the belg
failure in 1999 produced a near disaster rang alarm
bells with the international community about the
extent to which coping mechanisms had already
been exhausted, and therefore how much closer a
major disaster could be in the event of another
shock – even a minor one. Second, widely available
early warning information clearly documented the
food security situation in Ethiopia throughout
1999, with increasing urgency. By late 1999, all
available early warning bulletins were forecasting
imminent disaster. Third, there were early warning
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indications of a problem in Somali Region in the
second half of 1999 – though given a relative
dearth of baseline information, this information
was more difficult to interpret than was
information from the highlands. Fourth, the DPPC
itself issued several extraordinary appeals in
October and November 1999, one of which
explicitly highlighted the problem in pastoral areas,
and another highlighted the gap in the pipeline
that was developing. Yet little mobilisation of food
aid was achieved until months after these appeals
were issued.
3.3 Institutional mistrust among
international partners
Analysing the ‘missing links’ between early warning
and response – including, but not limited to,
Ethiopia – Buchanan-Smith and Davies (1995) note
that the problem of slow response is often to be
found in the institutional realm. In the Ethiopian
context, such an argument would hold that the early
warning system adequately picked up the problem,
but failed to mobilise the kind of response needed to
avert a disaster, in short, because donor agencies
were sceptical about the needs figures. The early
warning system in Ethiopia was decentralised in the
early 1990s including, critically, the judgement
about the number of vulnerable people and the
allocation of food aid. This system is believed to put
pressure on local authorities to produce exaggerated
numbers of population in need. While there was
little that external actors could do to verify that this
is the case, this perception meant that donors were
sceptical of needs estimates and in fact delivered
only a portion of the total estimated requirements
between 1994 and 1999. So long as this ‘under-
response’ had little visible negative impact on
human welfare outcome indicators such as
prevalence of malnutrition, for example, it was seen
as appropriate – at least informally (Hammond and
Maxwell 2002). One institutional improvement in
famine prevention and response capacity in Ethiopia
has been the introduction of joint assessment teams
(including Government of Ethiopia, UN, donor
agency and NGO staff), to make the needs
assessment process more transparent to all parties.
In theory, this should have prevented a problem of
institutional mistrust, but even after this system was
adopted, the problem continued to persist (Sandford
and Habtu 2000). 
The other side of this issue was the reluctance of the
Government to completely use up the reserves in the
EFSR, in the face of a large-scale disaster. Despite its
low stocks, the EFSR was never drawn down
completely, meaning that people were going hungry
even though there was some grain in the warehouses
– albeit less than 40,000 metric tons at some points,
or only about a week’s worth of distributable stocks.
Some observers argued that the emergency was of a
great enough magnitude that the entire reserve
should have been drawn down. But the Government
was sceptical about the reliability of an external food
aid pipeline that was managed by a number of
different agencies and clearly did not want to put
itself in the situation of having no reserve stocks (a
similar disagreement between the Government and
the humanitarian community occurred during 2000
in Eritrea). Again, the point here is not so much the
merits of the argument about when and how much
the Reserve should be drawn down as it is to simply
underline the evidence of a fairly high level of
mistrust among major partners at the height of the
crisis.
3.4 Political and diplomatic sticking
points: the war with Eritrea
The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was a major
thorn in the flesh of relations between the
Government of Ethiopia and donors. There was
little doubt in the minds of many Ethiopian policy-
makers at the time that the slow response to the
humanitarian crisis was one form of pressure from
the international community on Ethiopia to
peacefully and rapidly conclude the conflict with
Eritrea – a conflict that was largely viewed by the
donors as a pointless exercise that was diverting
much-needed resources in both countries. Again,
the issue here is not the merits of the war itself, but
rather how the war influenced relations between
the Government and donors, and the impact this
had on the humanitarian response. Donors did not
want humanitarian assistance to be seen in any way
as ‘subsidising’ the war, and governments on both
sides refused to have their foreign policy dictated
by external forces. Though donor objections with
regard to Ethiopia had more to do with general
national priorities than with specific evidence of
the direct diversion of humanitarian resources,
there was little doubt that such a war was using up
resources – financial and physical as well as human
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(IRIN 2000; Jeffery 2000). It also meant that
assistance had to be funnelled through Djibouti or
Berbera, rather than the Eritrean ports of Assab and
Massawa.
In theory, while some donors froze development
assistance to Ethiopia during the war, humanitarian
assistance was not supposed to be affected. But the
speed and magnitude of the international response
as the crisis built to its peak made many observers
think otherwise. Informally, donor agency staff
were willing to talk about the impact of the war on
the response in 1999. But once the story got into
the international media in early 2000, donor staff
said little more about the war – and indeed, this is
the point at which the international response was
speeded up significantly, implying that to whatever
extent the war had been an issue slowing the
response in 1999, the two issues had to be
separated once the crisis was peaking in 2000 and
it was picked up by the media. In any case, the war
effectively came to an end shortly thereafter.
Regardless of the merits of the war or how it ended,
there is little doubt that the end of the fighting
facilitated the speeding up of the humanitarian
response. But the evidence tends to suggest that the
international community (governments, donors,
and agencies) could not agree on how to separate
the humanitarian imperative and humanitarian
response from political and diplomatic objectives
in 1999 and early 2000. As noted elsewhere,
this was not a complex political emergency in
the classic sense of the term, in which people
were at risk of famine because they had been
attacked, displaced, or were otherwise
prevented from pursuing their livelihoods as a
direct result of a conflict. It was ‘complex’ in
the sense of diplomatic objectives being at odds
with humanitarian imperatives (Hammond and
Maxwell 2002: 63).
3.5 Underlying famine processes were
inadequately addressed by prevention
mechanisms
Much of famine preparedness in Ethiopia and
elsewhere focuses on famines as events – specific
episodes that put people at risk of starvation –
rather than as processes that over time lead to
either an improvement or a deterioration of
people’s livelihoods. Despite the improvements
made in famine preparedness mentioned in the
introduction, in many parts of the country,
including those most hard hit by the crisis, people
were steadily losing assets – and thus their ability
to cope with the shocks that led to the crisis – all
through the 1990s (Devereux and Sharp 2000;
Hammond 2001; Raisin 2001). In fact, the ‘under-
response’ to food insecurity in more ‘normal’ times
referred to above probably contributed to the speed
of the onset of the crisis in 1999, because although
there was no major increase in malnutrition during
1995–8, the effect of years of food insecurity was a
slow but steady process of destitution or depletion
of assets which significantly decreased coping
capacity.
Ironically, it appears in retrospect as though an
emphasis on putting more resources into
‘development’ in the mid-1990s may have actually
increased the likelihood of famine in Ethiopia, in
part because it separated emergency preparedness
and long-term poverty reduction efforts, rather
than integrating them. Many agencies that had
been involved in both activities earlier had focused
nearly exclusively on ‘development’ in the mid-late
1990s, as though emergencies were no longer part
of the equation. This meant that they were no
longer deliberately linking emergency
preparedness to development activities, and it also
meant that when the crisis struck, they were
inadequately prepared themselves to deal with it.
Despite the ‘development’ effort, recent UN
evidence shows that rural Ethiopians are as poor
now as they were two decades ago (IRIN 2002).
Ideas for re-integrating emergency preparedness
and poverty reduction have been suggested since
the crisis (Raisin 2001).
4 Conclusions: lessons learned
for future humanitarian
preparedness and response
Several major lessons can be noted that run the
gamut from ‘technical’ to ‘political’ in nature. While
lack of information is probably not to blame for the
crisis of 1999–2000, several lessons about
information systems can be drawn. One is that, in
addition to the standard early warning information
collected, the humanitarian community ought to
pay much closer attention to assets and the coping
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capacity of vulnerable populations. The underlying
process of destitution in rural Ethiopia was known,
but was not widely incorporated into early warning
analysis before the crisis. Second, early warning
systems developed for agricultural areas probably
require greater adaptation before being used in
pastoral areas. These points have been widely
acknowledged, and are currently being
incorporated into famine preparedness in Ethiopia.
The ‘lead time’ in loan repayment to the EFSR
needs to be substantially shortened. The alternative
is to increase the size of the EFSR, so that an
adequate amount of stock is held in country. This
is essentially what had been planned prior to the
crisis, but had not been implemented (NRI 1999).
Efforts are now underway to put this plan into
action.
Operational agencies almost certainly need to be
better advocates, both in terms of lobbying donors
and mobilising the media. An NGO statement of
April 2000 attempted to do this, but probably did
not do so in the most effective manner. A
concerted, long-term advocacy effort is needed that
pulls together the major partners to effectively raise
the resources to deal with both the recurrence of
emergencies in Ethiopia and their underlying
causes.
But the international humanitarian community also
needs to address several difficult questions that focus
on the political dimensions of famine prevention:
l How can the international community
(governments, donors, UN agencies, NGOs) be
held accountable for their obligations to
protect and respect the right to food and other
basic rights at a time when humanitarian
priorities and diplomatic/political priorities
clash? While individual agencies have
committed themselves to standards of
accountability in emergencies (Sphere Project
2000), these measures do not hold other actors
accountable. In an era of convergence or
‘coherence’ between political and humanitarian
objectives (Macrae and Leader 2000), are
divergent responses to humanitarian and
political imperatives possible?
l Could the international community have taken
a much more proactive role early on in
advocating for a different stance viz á viz both
the humanitarian emergency and the war?
Could the institutional problems have been
dealt with in isolation from the political
differences? Is something like an ‘anti-famine’
coalition a possibility at the international level?
l Given that humanitarian response during an
emergency is largely about redressing short-
term acute needs, how can long-term
underlying causal factors be successfully
addressed in such a way that foreseeing and
mitigating acute emergencies becomes an
integral part of on-going efforts to promote
rural development and reduce poverty?
These questions are going to be much more
difficult to answer than are specific initiatives to fix
technical problems. Yet now is the time when these
more difficult issues should be addressed.
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Notes
* This article is based on research on the Ethiopia crisis
of 1999–2000 conducted in the course of
professional work, but views expressed here are
personal and do not represent the official position of
CARE International. There is still a major controversy
over whether the Ethiopia crisis of 1999–2000
should be labelled a ‘famine’ or not, in light of the
emotive and political connotations of the word. In the
author’s view – given the number of people affected,
the damage to livelihoods and human development,
and the loss of human life – there is no question
about whether Ethiopia 1999–2000 was a famine.
But the continued controversy over this issue points
to the need for a broadly accepted operational
definition of famine and perhaps to differences over
the extent to which limited information can be
extrapolated over a broad area. This article does not
explicitly address those issues – rather it attempts to
identify major factors that caused (or allowed) the
crisis to become so serious.
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